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COMMENTS
"WRONGFUL LIFE": SHOULD THE
CAUSE OF ACTION BE RECOGNIZED?
The study of human genetics, one of the most rapidly de-
veloping areas of medical science, has provided numerous new
means of diagnosing and treating genetically based disorders.'
These advances, in addition to the widespread availability and
use of contraception 2 and the evolution of a woman's qualified
right to an abortion, 3 have given rise to difficult issues of legal li-
ability for those caring for and advising patients in matters relat-
ing to procreation .
4
The focus of this Comment is the cause of action character-
ized as "wrongful life," a phrase which has inappropriately
served as an umbrella covering a variety of factually distinguish-
able actions brought by a diverse group of plaintiffs.5 Actions
have been brought seeking damages for the births of healthy but
unwanted children, 6 planned children born with birth defects,
7
defective children whose birth or conception was unwanted,8
'Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 620
(1979).
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 See generally Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Phy-
siciansfor Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978); Comment, "Wrong-
ful Birth": Should Liability Be Imposed Upon A Physician Who Fails to Warn of the Risks
ofDefects in Their Unborn Children?, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 891 (1979).
5 Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477,481 (Ct. App. 1980).
6 E.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (negligent sterilization); Trop-
pi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (negligent filling of prescription for
oral contraceptives). See also Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control Methods,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1976).
7 E.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (parents not informed of availabil-
ity of amniocentesis); Turpin v. Sortini, No. S.F. 24319 (Cal. May 3, 1982) (failure to di-
agnose hereditary hearing defect).
8 E.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (birth of severely handicapped
child subsequent to negligently performed vasectomy); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (child born with neurofibromatosis following unsuccessful vasec-
tomy and unsuccessful abortion).
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and healthy but illegitimate children.9 The plaintiffs have in-
cluded parents, 10 prior-born siblings," and the children them-
selves. 12 For the purposes of this Comment, the term "wrongful
life" will designate only those causes of action, brought by or on
behalf of an infant plaintiff, which allege that a physician's neg-
ligence13-failure to adequately inform parents of the risks of the
pregnancy-has caused an infant's birth. The essence of the
child's claim is that butfor the physician's failure to give accurate
advice, his parents would have avoided conception or terminated
the pregnancy, and consequently the child would not have been
born to suffer his handicaps. 14
Although "wrongful life" actions have met almost unan-
imous judicial disapproval in various jurisdictions, 5 including
Kentucky,' dissents and critical commentaries 17 have accom-
9 Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964); Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9
(Wisc. 1974).
10 The cause of action brought by the parents on their own behalf is more appropri-
ately termed "wrongful birth" or "wrongful conception." See generally Note, Wrongful
Conception: Who Pays For Bringing Up Baby?, 47 FORDHAn L. REV. 418 (1978); Com-
ment, supra note 4.
11 Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cox v. Stretton, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974). In these cases, prior born siblings of the child born as a re-
sult of failed contraception sought recovery for the diminished love, affection, and finan-
cial support they received as a result of an increase in family size. See generally Robertson,
Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries,
Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1450.
12 "While courts and commentators have not always been consistent in their termi-
nology, 'wrongful life' has generally referred to actions brought on behalf ofchildren, and
.wrongful birth' to actions brought by parents." Turpin v. Sortini, No. S.F. 24319, slip op.
at 5 n.4.
13 In most cases, the defendant has been a physician. Potential defendants, however,
include genetic counselors, other medical paraprofessionals, and even the parents of the
child. See Comment, supra note 4, at 893.
14 Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
15 See Comment, supra note 4, at 894.
16 Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to accept
wrongful life but accepting the parents' action for wrongful birth).
17 For examples of dissenters supporting the claim, see Turpin v. Sortini, No. S.F.
24319 (Cal. May 3, 1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d at 21 (Hand-
ler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There should be no insurmountable
legal obstacle in recognizing and vindicating the infant's cause of action."); Cleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (N.J. 1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). The Gleitman dissent ob-
served:
While the law cannot remove the heartache or undo the harms, it can afford
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panied these decisions. Additionally, in 1980, the California
Court of Appeals, in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,1
8
held that a "wrongful life" claim stated a legally cognizable
cause of action. In light of this and other recent attempts by ap-
pellate courts to recognize a "wrongful life" cause of action, this
Comment will review the evolution of the "wrongful life" claim,
analyze it within the traditional tort framework, and suggest
that the public policy considerations which bar this cause of ac-
tion'9 are inconsistent with judicial responses to other medical
some reasonable measure of compensation towards alleviating the financial
burdens. In declining to do so, it permits a wrong with serious consequential
injury to go wholly unredressed. That provides no deterrent to professional
irresponsibility and is neither just nor compatible with expanding principles
of liability in the field of torts.
227 A.2d at 703.
A number of commentators have also criticized rejection of the cause of action.
E.g., Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization: A Cause of Action for Parent and Child,
12 J. FAM. L. 635 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy After Sterilization]; Com-
ment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REv. 480 (1980) [herein-
after cited as The Right Not To Be Born]; Comment, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim
Which Conforms to the Traditional Tort Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125 (1979)
[hereinafter cited asA Modern Claim.].
18 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1980).
19 See Turpin v. Sortini, No. S.F. 24319 (Cal. May 3, 1982). In Turpin, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court allowed a child, Joy Turpin, to maintain her independent cause of ac-
tion alleging that both a pediatrician and a hospital were "negligent [in the] performance
of their professional tasks" in that they failed properly to diagnose her older sister's hered-
itary hearing defect. Id., slip op. at 13. Joy asserted her claim under a wrongful life theory
claiming that, but for the defendants" negligent diagnosis, she would not have been con-
ceived and thus would not be forced to suffer an impaired existence. Her complaint sought
two types of recovery:
(1) general damages for being "deprived of the fundamental right of a child
to be born as a whole, functional human being without total deafness" and
(2) special damages for the "extraordinary expenses for specialized teaching,
training and hearing equipment" which she will incur during her lifetime as
a result of her hearing impairment.
Id., slip op. at 3-4.
The California Supreme Court approved a cause of action seeking special dam-
ages, but rejected a claim for general damages. This refusal to follow the earlier recogni-
tion analysis of Curlender denied the claim for general damages because:
(1) it is simply impossible to determine in any rational or reasoned fashion
whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired
rather than not being born, and (2) even if it were possible to overcome the
first hurdle, it would be impossible to assess general damages in any fair,
nonspeculative manner.
Id., slip op. at 22.
Furthermore, the court determined that the value of Joy's life (conferred as a
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legal dilemmas and that this cause of action should therefore be
recognized.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE "WRONGFUL LIFE" CLAIM
The first "wrongful life" claim arose in Zepeda v. Zepeda,2 a
suit brought by an illegitimate child against his father alleging
injury solely because of his illegitimacy. In Zepeda, and subse-
quent cases, children sued their parents or the state,2' alleging
that the defendant's negligence caused them to be wrongfully
born and forced to endure the stigma associated with illegit-
imacy. Many issues raised by these cases are not within the scope
of this Comment, but the cases are significant in that they have
formed a basis2 for judicial analyses and, to some extent, for res-
olution of the issues raised by the birth of a genetically impaired
child.
In Zepeda, the Illinois appellate court held that the plain-
tiffs complaint did allege the commission of a tort, but affirmed
its dismissal, refusing to indulge in judicial law-making where
the result could be so far-reaching and preferring to leave such
public policy decisions to the legislature.2 In 1966, the New York
court in Williams v. State 4 readily adopted this "public policy"
rationale, and although it acknowledged that the state, as guar-
dian of a sexually assaulted mother, was "grievously neglectful,"
"benefit" of the defendants' negligence) offset the damage done to her "general physical,
emotional and psychological well-being." Id., slip op. at 26. This determination was con-
sistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979). For a discussion of this provi-
sion of the Restatement, see note 106 infra.
20 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
21 E.g., Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343. An infant, born out of wedlock to a men-
tally deficient mother as a result of sexual assault on the mother while she was a patient in
a state mental hospital, filed a claim against the state which had negligently failed to pre-
vent the assault. Id. This, and other cases involving healthy children, have been more ap-
propriately termed "dissatisfied life" cases. See Comment, The Right Not To Be Born,
supra note 17.
22 See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689; Stewart v. Long Island College
Hosp., 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1970),
ajJ'd, 283 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1972).
23 190 N.E.2d at 858-59. The court stated that "encouragement would extend to all
others born into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek
damages for being of a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a
hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics." Id. at 858.
24 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966).
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the court refused recovery to the child, holding that "[b]eing
born under one set of circumstances... rather than another is
not a suable wrong that is cognizable in court."2s
These cases, and ones that followed, based on wrongful con-
ception, illegitimate birth or failure to diagnose pregnancies,
stand distinctly apart from the case in which the essence of the
wrong is the birth of an abnormal child for whom extraordinary
care and treatment is required. Yet the commentary26 following
Zepeda and Williams strongly influenced the court in Gleitman
v. Cosgrove,-' a "wrongful life" action in which the term was
first accurately applied to claims brought by a defective child
against a physician.2s In Gleitman, a woman continued a preg-
nancy on the repeated and erroneous assurances of the defendant
physician that rubella,9 contracted in the first trimester of her
pregnancy, would not affect the fetus. Consequently, the preg-
nancy continued and Mrs. Gleitman gave birth to a child who
was deaf, mute, nearly blind and possibly retarded.-° The major-
ity of the court in Gleitman barred recovery by either the
parents3' or the child citing both the "impossibility" of comput-
ing damages and "public policy." In particular, the court stated:
The normal measure of damages in tort actions is compen-
satory. Damages are measured by comparing the condition
2 Id. at 344.
26See Tedesohi, On Tort Liability Jor'Wrongful Life, 1 ISRAELL. REV. 513(1966).
27 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
28 In Gleitman, the court relied on Tedeschi's standing argument: "[N]o comparison
is possible since were it not for the act of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of
action, the plaintiff cuts from under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in
order to prove his damage." Tedeschi, supra note 26, at 529. See 227 A.2d at 692.
2 Rubella, also known as German measles, is marked in adults by enlargement of
lymph nodes, but usually little fever or constitutional reaction. It is of importance because
of the high incidence of abnormalities of children from infection during the first several
months of fetal life.
30 227 A.2d at 690.
31 The court argued that, even assuming Mrs. Gleitman could have obtained an
abortion, it would be against public policy to allow the parents to recover for the loss of
"the opportunity to take an embryonic life." Id. at 693. This argument led one commenta-
tor to remark that, in spite of the majority's assumption of the availability of abortion,
"the firm New Jersey public policy against abortion permeated the majority and concur-
ring opinions." Robertson, supra note 11, at 1452. Butsee Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d at 14
("In light of changes in the law.. . since Gleitman .... the [anti-abortion policy] relied
upon by the Gleitman majority can no longer stand .... ) .
1981-82]
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plaintiff would have been in, had the defendants not been neg-
ligent, with plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the
negligence. The infant plaintiff would have us measure the dif-
ference between his life with defects against the utter void of
nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determina-
tion. This Court cannot weigh the value of life with impair-
ments against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that
he should not have been born, the infant makes it logically im-
possible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of
the impossibility of making the compensation required by
compensatory remedies. 32
Although it delineated the traditional tort analysis for deter-
mining damages, the court in Gleitman failed to complete its
analysis," and based its denial of recovery on the logical impossi-
bility of making the comparison between life with defects and
nonexistence.a4 Thus, as one commentator has suggested, the
Gleitman court failed to separate the issue of whether the tradi-
tional tort framework could be used in "wrongful life" cases from
the subsidiary issue of whether the necessary valuation could be
made in order to arrive at a compensatory figurea 5
32 227 A.2d at 692. Butsee Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d at 12 ("Although we conclude
as did the Gleitman majority, that [the child] has failed to state an actionable claim for re-
lief we base our result upon a different premise-that [the child] has not suffered any
damage cognizable at law .... ).
33 Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life"- A Suggested Analysis, 55 MINN. L.
REv. 58, 63 (1970).
34 The court refused to accept that nonexistence could ever be preferred over life, no
matter how unpleasant:
The right to life is inalienable in our society. A court cannot say what defects
should prevent an embryo from being allowed life such that denial of the op-
portunity to terminate the existence of a defective child in embryo can sup-
port a cause of action. Examples of famous persons who have had great
achievements despite physical defects come readily to mind, and many of us
can think of examples close to home. A child need not be perfect to have a
worthwhile life.
227 A.2d at 693.
But Gleitman is not the last word on recovery in New Jersey. Both Berman v.
Allan, 404 A.2d 8, and Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 841 (N.J. 1981), permitted the
parents to recover special damages for medical expenses, thereby overruling the earlier
refusal by the Gleitman court to allow any damages at all. Cf. Turpin v. Sortini, No. S.F.
24319 (Cal. May 3,1982).
' Note, supra note 33, at 64.
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With little further elaboration or analysis, courts have over-
whelmingly relied on the Gleitman decision to reject the validity
of the "wrongful life" claim.-" In 1977, however, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Park v. Chessin,37 became
the first court to recognize the "wrongful life" action. The
parents in Park had previously had a child who lived only five
hours after birth, dying as a result of a polycystic kidney disease,
a fatal hereditary disease in which there is a substantial probabil-
ity that any future child born to the same parents will be afflicted
with the disease.-" The parents sought the defendants' advice as
to the possible risk of any future child born to them, and were in-
accurately advised that the disease was not hereditary and that
the chances of a future child being born with polycystic kidney
disease were nearly nonexistent.3 Relying on these assurances,
the Parks conceived a second child who was born with the disease
and who died two and one-half years later. An action for
"wrongful life," brought on the child's behalf, was upheld by the
New York Superior Court and affirmed by the Appellate Divi-
sion. Acknowledging lack of precedent and the fact that prior
causes of action had not met with favor in any jurisdiction, the
court stated:
[C]ases are not decided in a vacuum; rather decisional law
must keep pace with expanding technological, economic and
social change. Inherent in the abolition of the statutory ban on
36 See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (Tay-Sachs undetected); LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976)
(failed tubal ligation); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (un-
diagnosed rubella); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (failed vasectomy); Tur-
pin v. Sortini, No. S.F. 24319, slip op. at 23 (Cal. May 3, 1982) (failure to diagnose hered-
itary hearing defect); Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Ct. App. 1976) (negligent
abortion; healthy child); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 364 N.E.2d 1340 (N.Y. 1977) ("cri-du-
chat" child; failure to advise of amniocentesis); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 296
N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (rubella); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (Downs Syndrome); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (neuro-
fibromatosis); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wise. 1975).
37 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), modified sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz,
386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
38 Infantile polycystic kidney disease is always fatal in infancy. It is caused by two
abnormal recessive genes, one from each parent; the "substantial probability" can be cal-
culated to be exactly 25% risk to all future children of a couple who have previously had
an affected child. Comment, TheRight Not To BeBorn, supra note 17, at 480 n.1.
39 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
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abortion is a public policy consideration which gives potential
parents the right, within certain statutory and case law limita-
tion, not to have a child. This right extends to instances in
which it can be determined with reasonable medical certainty
that the child would be born deformed. The breach of this
right may also be said to be tortious to the fundamental right of
a child to be born as a whole functional human being.
40
On the following day, the same court addressed a similar ac-
tion in Becker v. Schwartz.41 Relying on its decision in Park, the
court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the cause of action and
granted a "wrongful life" claim for the child's pain and suffering.
However, the duration of the New York court's recognition of the
"wrongful life" action was short. One year later, the New York
Court of Appeals, consolidating the cases on appeal, held that
the complaints did not state a legally cognizable cause of action.
42
The court's rationale was that there was no legally cognizable in-
jury since the infants did not have a fundamental right to be born
as whole functional human beings, and that calculation of dam-
ages was impossible since it demanded "a comparison between
the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexis-
tence." 43 With this resounding reversal, the "wrongful life" cause
of action appeared to be consigned to the "utter void of nonexis-
tence" until the recognition of the action by the California Court
of Appeals in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories in June,
1980, a decision which itself has been subsequently limited by the
California Supreme Court's May, 1982 decision in Turpin v. Sor-
40 Id. at 114.
41 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), modified, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
42 Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). The court stated:
Even as a pure question of law ... the weighing of the validity of a cause of
action seeking compensation for the wrongful causation of life itself casts an
almost Orwellian shadow, premised as it is upon concepts of genetic predic-
tability once foreign to the evolutionary process. It borders on the absurdly
obvious to observe that resolution of this question transcends the mechanical
application of legal principles.
Id. at 810.
43 Id. at 812. "Whether it is better never to have been born with even gross deficien-
cies is a mystery more properly left to the philosophers and theologians." Id. See generally
Comment, Wrongful Life and a Fundamental Right to be Born Healthy: Park v. Chessin;
Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BUFFALO L. Rav. 537 (1978).
[Vol. 70
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II. CURLENDER v. BIo-SCIENCE LABORATORIES
In 1977, Phillis and Hyam Curlender retained Bio-Science
Laboratories to determine whether either parent was a genetic
carrier of a hereditary condition known as Tay-Sachs disease.45
The tests were performed and, relying on the assurances of the
defendants as to their non-carrier status, the Curlenders became
parents.4 On May 10, 1978, they were informed that their infant
daughter, Shauna, had Tay-Sachs disease-the condition they
feared and had specifically sought to avoid.47
Shauna brought an action alleging that the negligent dissem-
ination of inaccurate information to her parents by the defen-
dants resulted in her birth. She sought damages for cost of care,
emotional distress, and deprivation of life, as well as punitive
damages.4 The defendants demurred to the complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action; the trial court sus-
tained and dismissed. Due to the procedural posture of the case
before the court on appeal, the factual allegations of the plead-
44 No. S.F. 24319 (Cal. May 3, 1982). It is interesting to note that in both California
and New York the intermediate appellate courts have attempted to award both gnneral
and special damages under the rubric of "wrongful life," but that both attempts to gain ju-
dicial acceptance of the full cause of action has been limited by the states' highest courts.
45 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
46 The court noted that the complaint, which they described as one "less than art-
fully drawn," did not indicate the date of Shauna's birth; thus it was not apparent whe-
ther her parents had relied on the defendants' assurances in deciding to conceive a child, or
if the pregnancy was in progress and their reliance resulted in not seeking amniocentesis
and abortion. Id.
47 Tay-Sachs is a fatal progressive degenerative disease of the nervous system affect-
ing children of various ages from four months to 12 years. It is characterized by partial or
complete loss of vision, mental underdevelopment, softening of the muscles, convulsions,
etc.
Shauna's disease was manifested by mental retardation, convulsions, sluggishness,
failure to fix objects visually, loss of motor reactions, loss of head and trunk control,
muscle atrophy, blindness, inability to feed orally, decerebrate rigidity and gross physical
deformity. Id. at 480-81.
48 Id. at 481. The complaint sought damages based on actuarial life expectancy as if
the plaintiff had been normal. Recovery on this basis is inconsistent with the essence of the
wrongful life claim. Shauna could not allege that but for the defendants' negligence she
would have been normal, but rather that she would not have been born.
Later, the California Supreme Court identified the categories of recovery: general
damages and special damages. See note 19 supra for a discussion of the court's treatment of
these damages in Turpin.
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ings were accepted as true49 and the issue, one of first impression
in California, was framed by the court as follows: "What rem-
edy, if any, is available . . . to a severely impaired child-genet-
ically defective-born as a result of defendant's negligence in
conducting certain genetic tests of the child's parents-tests,
which, if properly done would have disclosed the high probabil-
ity that the actual catastrophic result would occur?"'50
After an examination of the treatment of the issue by other
jurisdictions, and a cursory analysis of the cause of action within
a tort framework, the Curlender court concluded that it was con-
sistent with the then existing decisional and statutory law of Cali-
fornia to recognize Shauna's "wrongful life" action. It then
properly construed the cause of action as the right of a defective
child to recover damages for the pain and suffering endured dur-
ing her limited life span and for any pecuniary loss resulting from
the impaired existence. 51
III. APPLICATION OF A TORT ANALYSIS
TO THE WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF ACTION
In examining the wrongful life cause of action under a tradi-
tional tort analysis, 52 it is necessary to identify the basic elements
of an action in tort. These elements are: a duty to use care owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty prox-
imately causing harm to the plaintiff, and damage in fact to the
plaintiff.53
49 The court specifically stated that "in our examination of the complaint we are
guided by the well settled principles governing the testing of its sufficiency by demurrer: A
demurrer admits all material and issuable facts properly pleaded." Id. at 480 (citing Daar
v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732,745 (Cal. 1967)).
50 165 Cal. Rptr. at479-80.
51 Id. at 489. ButseeTurpinv. Sortini, No. S.F. 24319 (Cal. May 3, 1982).
52 One commentator has suggested that there is no reason to be confined to a tort
analysis in such unique cases; a varying standard of valuation of damages could be hypoth-
esized. He further noted that the principles of equity may dictate a unique approach when
the court is presented with a unique factual situation which it concludes warrants relief.
Note, supra note 33, at 67.
53 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRs § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
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A. Duty
With the modern development of torts en ventre sa mere,
54
there can be little doubt that under the proper circumstances a
third party may owe a duty of due care to an unborn child.s
Since the essence of the child's claim is that but for the failure of
the physician to advise or inform parents accurately he would not
have been born, the duty must be found within an obligation of a
physician to disclose information as to the likelihood of fetal de-
fects, or the consequences of the parental disease or condition.
Courts, although initially reluctant,O now have little diffi-
culty in finding that a physician has a duty to disclose the likeli-
hood of deformity of a child in order to permit the parents to
choose whether to conceive or whether to carry the pregnancy to
term.57 In adapting this duty of conveying accurate information
to the child's claim, two approaches have been suggested. First,
it has been suggested that the duty owed to the parents inures de-
rivatively to the child:59 "[Olne who negligently gives false infor-
mation to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused
by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such in-
formation, where such harms results ... to such persons as the
actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken." 6 This
approach further suggests that if the physician knows or should
know of a significant risk of birth of a defective child and fails to
inform or inaccurately informs the parents, the reliance of the
parents on his assurances or non-disclosure is foreseeable, as is the
54 A tort en ventre sa mere is an action by an infant for injuries received while in its
mother's womb. BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 479 (5th ed. 1979). Dietric v. Inhabitants of
Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), was the first case to deal with a prenatal injury ac-
tion. The action was denied, the court holding that an unborn child had no judicial exis-
tence. Contra Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
-5 Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537,542 (D.S.C. 1980).
56 See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d at 691 (informed consent does not in-
elude a duty on the part of a physician to inform mother of possibility of birth defects re-
sulting from rubella).
57 E.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
8 See Note, supra note 33; Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17;
Comment, A Modern Claim, supra note 17.
59 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 490. See also Capron, In-
formed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the "Wrongful Life" Debate,
48 IND. L.J. 581 (1973). But see Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and justice in
Tort Law, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 919,939-40 (1979).
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1971). See, e.g., Shack v. Holland, 389
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birth of the defective child. 6' A duty to the parents has therefore
been breached and the child, the one who suffers the life with de-
fects, is the person imperiled by the breach.62
Second, it has been suggested that the duty to inform is owed
directly to the child as well as to the parents. 3 This theory states
that during a pregnancy, both the mother and the fetus are pa-
tients. An unborn child, for the purposes of tort recovery, is con-
sidered a "person" from the moment of conception. 64 This "sep-
arate duty" premise, and logical objections to it, were thought-
fully articulated by one commentator:'
[O]ne could argue that this same duty to inform should not be
owed separately to a fetus who is incapable of acting on the in-
formation given by the physician. Although logical, this ap-
proach defines duty too narrowly. Under this definition, no
duty to the fetus would exist where the prevention of the injury
(the deformed birth) depended upon the actions of an inter-
vening third party (the parents). The flaw in this approach is
revealed by analogizing to the area of prenatal injuries. Con-
sider the case where a landlord fails to inform a pregnant
woman tenant of a step he knows to be dangerously loose on
her staircase, and the fetus is injured when the mother trips on
the step. Applying the narrow definition of duty . .. the land-
owner would not be responsible to the fetus because the dis-
charge of his duty-warning the mother.. .- would not
necessarily save the fetus from injury. The prevention of injury
would depend upon a third person acting upon his warning, as
the fetus itself is obviously incapable of doing so. Yet the law
N.Y.S.2d 988, 993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (liability of physician for lackof informed consent
of the mother inures to the infant who suffered injury during delivery).
61 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 490.
62 Id. at 490-91. Contra Note, Torts-Wrongful Life-No Cause of Action for Fail-
ure to Inform of Possible Birth Defects, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 750 (1967). The author states:
[W]hat duty, aside from the preservation of fetal health, did the defendant
doctors... owe? The plaintiffs would say, a duty to give the parents the
opportunity to terminate the fetal life. But the conclusion follows that this is
not a duty owing to the unborn, for the rights are solely in the parents to de-
mand the exercise of the duty since they are the ones who can react to the in-
formation and thereby profit from it.
Id. at 756.
63 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 489-90.
64 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. at 140. See also Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d at 20
(Handler, J., concurring in part, dissentingin part).
6 The author credits this line of reasoning to Note, supra note 33, at 70.
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does not preclude a duty to the child merely because in its fetal
state it was unable to act upon the . . . disclosure.6
This theory also suggests that the inability of the fetus to exercise
a choice between life with defects and nonexistence should not
abrogate the duty of the physician to inform. The discharge of
the duty allows the parents, as informed agents of the child,7 to
exercise their judgment on its behalf. Thus, in deciding to avoid
conception or to abort the pregnancy, the parents are acting in
the best interests of the child that they have chosen not to con-
ceive or bear.
Inescapably, this analysis rests on the assumption that a
choice of nonexistence, made by a third party, may be to the
benefit of the fetus. It is an assumption that has disturbed the
courts,6 as well as commentators," one of whom has stated:
"[T]his objective preference argument. .. contradicts the fun-
damental principle in our society that the life of each human be-
ing, whether handicapped or not, is valuable and deserves re-
spect and protection." 70 This statement alludes to a flaw in the
aforementioned analogy to prenatal injury cases: there the
healthy fetus, if given the option to choose, would surely have
chosen not to have been injured; in the "wrongful life" context,
the defective fetus' choice is not between health or impairment,
but between life with defects or nonexistence. To decide, in the
latter case, what the choice of the fetus would be, if informed
and capable of acting upon that information, is inherently more
speculative than projecting the choice of the fetus in the former.
An analysis of this issue has been suggested:
66 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 489-90 (emphasis added).
67 Note, Wrongful Life-A Tort Whose Time Has Come, 2 AM. J. TmAL ADv. 107,
121 (1978). See Note, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard for Non-Treatment Decision,
30 STAN. L. REv. 599, 609-10 (1978), for a discussion of the legal implications of parental
decisionmaking on behalf of newborn birth-defective infants.
6 See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689. The court stated:
It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it however heav-
ily burdened. If Jeffrey could have been asked as to whether his life should
be snuffed out before his full term of gestation could run its course, our felt
irltuition of human nature tells us he would almost surely choose life with
defects as against no life at all.
Id. at 693.
69 See Kelley, supra note 59.
70 Id. at 939.
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It cannot be denied that parents and child may have conflict-
ing interests, but the judicial opinions on genetics nowhere ex-
plicitly state that parents are disqualified from choosing. It
would be ironic were parents to be disqualified when the deci-
sion to abort would at least arguably benefit the potential child
(by saving it from suffering a severely impaired life) since after
Roe the parents could not, of course, be kept from aborting
when they have no desire to benefit the child. Yet, in declining
to recognize a right of recovery, the courts are in effect holding
that parents cannot be regarded as choosing on the child's be-
half if they say they would have had an abortion. . . .This is
simply a reiteration of the conclusion that any life is preferable
to non-life. It is equally wrong for the state to substitute its
judgment for that of a child (as exercised by its parents) on
whether the child's particular burdens make existence or non-
existence preferable. The sphere of privacy that protects each
family's decisions about reproduction would crumble if the
state could impose a uniform rule that life is always prefer-
able .... 71
A duty analysis, based on informed consent and the ability to
act on that information, has been afforded only cursory examina-
tion by most courts. 72 Some courts have simply concluded that a
duty exists, 73 while others have dismissed an analysis of the issue
as not bearing on the final resolution of the case. 74 The vigorous
dissent in Berman v. Allan,75 advocating recognition of the in-
fant's claim, resolved the duty issue by emphasizing that the de-
71 Capron, supra note 1, at 652-53. The California Supreme Court, in Turpin v. Sor-
tini, stated that "we cannot assert with confidence that in every situation there would be a
societal consensus that life is preferable to never having been born at all." No. S.F. 24319,
slip op. at 22. For further discussion of Turpin, see note 19 supra.
72 E.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689; Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp.,
296 N.Y.S.2d 41.
73 E.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477. In Curlender,
the court specifically stated:
We have no difficulty in ascertaining and finding the existence of a duty
owed ... to parents and their as yet unborn children .... The public pol-
icy considerations ... dictate recognition of such a duty, and it is of signif-
icance that in no decision that has come to our attention which has dealt
with the 'wrongful life' concept has it been suggested that public policy con-
siderations negate the existence of such a duty.
Id. at 488. But see Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d at 481 (Kentucky court stating that,
as to the child, "[plublic policy can.. cut off the legal responsibility of the physician").
74 Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. at 542.
75 404 A.2d at 20 (Handler, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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fendant doctors' medical malpractice encompassed the child as
well as the mother, and that by the very nature of the care-
providing relationship the duty enveloped the child as well. 76
B. Proximate Cause
Even if a breach of a duty is causally linked to the harm in-
curred, liability is not imposed unless the breach is the proximate
cause of the harm. 7 Early wrongful life cases78 often propounded
a proximate cause argument that maternal illness or an hered-
itary condition-not the defendants' negligence-was the prox-
imate cause of the child's defects. 79 This argument seriously mis-
interpreted the basis of the child's claim, which is not that the de-
fendant caused the defects, but caused the life with defects by
precluding any parental option to prevent that life. Thus, the
physician's failure to warn may be an intervening cause if it
arises after a maternal illness or after the risk of birth defects has
come to his knowledge, and, in the case of pre-conception failure
to warn, may precede the intervening cause 0 In the latter case,
if the intervening cause (the parents' decision to conceive a child)
was foreseeable, the defendant is not absolved of liability.8' Re-
cent wrongful life cases have found little difficulty, in either sit-
uation, in determining the physician's misfeasance or nonfeas-
ance to be the proximate cause of the child's injuries. 82
A remaining problem to be resolved in the proximate cause
analysis is that the defendant will be liable as having proximately
caused the child's injury only if it is shown that the parents, act-
ing on behalf of the child, would have chosen not to have the
76 Id. See Turpin v. Sortini, No. S.F. 24319, slip op. at 12 ("although the cause of ac-
tion at issue has attracted a special narne-'wrongful life'-plaintiff's basic contention is
that her action is simply one form of the familiar medical or professional malpractice ac-
tion").
77 See W. PROSSER, supra note 53, § 42, at 244.
78 E.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654; Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d
689.
79 Seegenerally Comment, A Modern Claim, supra note 17, at 144-46.
8 0 Id.
81 E.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) ("wrongful birth" action for
birth of child after negligent sterilization).
82 E.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8; Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496.
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child had they known of the risk." The proof problem is of little
difficulty in the cases where the parents affirmatively sought ge-
netic counseling or amniocentesis for the express purpose of
avoiding the birth of a defective child and were misinformed by
the physician.84 A more difficult situation arises, however, when
parents were unaware of the risk and the physician, knowing of
that risk or chargable with its knowledge, failed to disclose it to
the parents.85
It has been suggested that either a "subjective" or "objective"
standard may be applied in determining whether the parents
would indeed have avoided conception or terminated the preg-
nancy.86 The "objective standard," based on the standard for in-
formed consent disclosure, 87 would only require that a physician
or counselor reveal the information that a "reasonable person'"
would consider significant in selecting treatment. What the par-
ents' decision would have been if they had been informed would
also be determined by the "reasonable person" standard. This
objective standard has been criticized as harboring potential for
abuse in that it gives the physician considerable discretion as to
what information to disclose and takes an objective approach to
a very personal, subjective decision. Applying a "subjective
standard" would require a physician to disclose all relevant infor-
mation as to the risks of birth defects, independent of what a
"reasonable person" would find significant in selecting treat-
ment. Parents would then be required to show that they, rather
than a "reasonable person," would have prevented the birth.89
This more flexible approach eliminates the subjective determina-
tion of the physician as to what a "reasonable person" should
know, yet subjects him to claims of parents-after the fact of the
birth of a defective child whose burdens have become very real-
that they would have chosen to prevent the birth had they been
informed decisionmakers.
83 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 491-92.
84 See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477; Park v.
Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110.
8 E.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689.
86 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 492.
87 Note, supra note 4, at 1509-10.
89 Id. at 1509.
89 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 492.
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C. Damages
Beginning with Gleitman v. Cosgrove,90 many cases and
commentators found weighing the value of life with impairments
against nonexistence to be "logically impossible."91 Courts, ac-
cepting the Gleitman reasoning as determinative, relied heavily
on the conclusion that damages were not ascertainable.9 2 Gleit-
man, in turn, relied on the commentator Tedeschi, whose prem-
ise was that any wrongful life action must fail because "the ele-
ment of damages is missing if no difference can be drawn (in
wealth or happiness) between the result of the act and its ab-
sence.""3 This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that
one can assign negative or positive values to a balance between
happiness and misery in life, but that no comparison can be
made between life and nonexistence, since there is no happiness
or misery in the latter state.94
Although the Gleitman court held that the value of nonexis-
tence was unmeasurable, the language of the opinion belied this
conclusion and attributed a definite negative valuation to non-
existence. 9 In refusing to recognize the infant's damages, the
court interjected its own implicit notions of the values of the re-
spective states of importance into the damages assessment.90 This
led one commentator to remark that "a refusal to authorize dam-
ages ... appears more a matter of policy than logic." 97 Denial of
recovery in a tort action based upon inability to determine dam-
ages has been widely criticized as "a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice [denying] all relief to the injured person, and
thereby reliev[ing] the wrongdoer from making amends for his
acts."9 Recent wrongful life cases have frequently acknowledged
this criticism and abandoned the immeasurability argument.9 As
90 227 A.2d at 689 (N.J. 1967).
91 See Comment, supra note 43, at556-57.
92 E.g., Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 296 N.Y.S.2d 41.
93 Tedeschi, supra note 26, at 533.
94 Id. at 530.
95 227 A.2d 689. The court stated that "the infant would have us measure the differ-
ence between his life with defects and the utter void of non-existence .. ." Id. at 692.
9 See Comment, supra note 43, at 556.
97 Capron, supra note 1, at 648.
98 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
99 Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477; Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8; Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537.
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the Gleitman court pointed out: "The normal measure of dam-
ages in tort action is compensatory. Damages are measured by
comparing the condition the plaintiff would have been in had the
defendants' not been negligent, with the plaintiffs impaired con-
dition as a result of the negligence." ''0
One commentator has suggested that such a traditional tort
analysis, involving a comparison of nonexistence with a handi-
capped life, 10' was implicit in the Gleitman decision. That author
notes, however, that instead of expressing the valuation of non-
existence as a negative value, 0 2 it would be more appropriate in
cases with severe defects to value nonexistence at zero, life with
defects at some negative amount, and life without defects at a
positive amount.0 3
This analysis is appealing, yet limited. First, it hypothesizes
that life with defects may have a negative value only in cases of
severe defect. Second, by interjecting a positive valuation of life
without defects as a variable to be considered in the analysis, it
implies a comparison of the value of a normal life with the value
of a life with defects. In doing so, it ignores the underlying pre-
mise of the wrongful life claim that the plaintiff could never have
been normal, and thus the comparison is inappropriate. The
proper comparison, therefore, is between a defective life and
nonexistence. o4 -
A more appropriate method for determining damages is to
apply a "mitigation of damages" or "benefits rule" approach,""
and balance the benefits of life against the detriments of the de-
formity.lca Under this approach, nonexistence is assigned a neu-
tral value and the value of life with defects is expressed as the dif-
100 227 A.2d at 692.
101 Note, supra note 33, at 65.
102 Id. Other commentators have criticized Tedeschi's arguments as applied to
wrongful life cases by noting that he addressed only the wrongful statuslillegitimacy cases
in his analysis, not those involving handicapping conditions.
103 Note, supra note 33, at 65-66.
104 Capron, supra note 1, at 658.
105 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 497.
106 RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to
his property and in doing so has conferred a special benefit to the interest of
the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is con-
sidered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
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ference between the benefits conferred by life and the conse-
quences of the defective condition. 0 7 A jury could possibly use
such an approach in the following manner:
Where the child's deformity is slight, the jury might find that
the burden of living with the defect is offset by the benefits of
life, and deny the child recovery. Where the deformity is se-
vere, however, the jury might find that this burden out-
weighed any benefits, and award the child compensation. The
amount of the award would reflect the difference between the
burden of life with defects and the benefit of that life. The
more severe the handicap, the less beneficial the child's exis-
tence and the greater the award. 10
Developing a framework for valuation overcomes the objec-
tion that the comparison cannot be made. The second problem,
accurate assessment of the variables, is not so great as to warrant
precluding a jury from making such a determination.' 9 Subjec-
tive calculations about the value of life, pain and suffering, and
other intangibles are routinely made by jurors:
[J]urors can never actually experience a plaintiff's life in its
"normal state" before an injury or in the injured state that re-
sulted from a defendant's action. An imaginative leap is always
required; the more severe the injury, the greater the
leap.... [A] thoughtful assessment of damages requires an
imaginative leap in the.case of a child with congenital defects
in order to account for the condition the child would have been
in had the defendant acted properly." 0
In cases such as these there will always be an element of "empa-
thetic speculation,""' but the determinations of a jury or other
fact-finder, reflecting the collective judgment of a community as
107 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 497-98. See Turpin v.
Sortini, No. S.F. 24319 (Cal. May 3, 1982). For a discussion of the application of the bene-
fits rule in Turpin, see note 19supra.
108 Id. at 498. The author suggests that one advantage of the balancing approach is
that the child is compensated for his injuries, but only to the extent the physician's negli-
gence caused actual harm, thus allowing courts to grant recovery while still recognizing
that life with defects has some benefits.
109 See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. at 563.
110 Capron, supra note 1, at 658-59.
"1 Id. at 658.
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to the proper remedy for a specific harm, are the most acceptable
means of arriving at a damages determination."
2
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Courts in several cases, after overcoming the conceptual
hurdles presented by the duty, proximate cause, and damages is-
sues, have still declined to recognize the infant's "wrongful life!"
action for various public policy reasons."3 Public policy argu-
ments presented to deny the cause of action include: an unwill-
ingness to preempt a perceived legislative prerogative, a lack of
judicial precedent," 4 state bans on abortion prior to Roe v.
Wade, the metaphysical nature of the issues presented," 5 and the
absence of a legally cognizable cause of action.116
In response to the legislative preemption argument, it has
been pointed out that "new and nameless torts are being recog-
nized constantly, and the progress of the common law is marked
by many cases of first impression, in which the court struck out
boldly to create a new cause of action ... ,"' Lack of prece-
dent has never been an absolute deterrent to the development of
new torts. In fact, numerous causes of action have been created
by the courts rather than the legislature. These judicially created
causes of action include: loss of consortium, invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of emotional and mental distress, and
112 Id. at 649. The ability of the jury to make such determinations has been assessed
as follows:
If one assumes the most complex rule of recovery-in which the child's
injured condition is compared with nonexistence rather than normal exis-
tence-one is still dealing with two conditions that jurors are permitted to
evaluate in other cases. In wrongful death cases the plaintiff's "normal" con-
dition before the defendant acted ... is compared to nonexistence; in in-
jury cases, the "normal" condition is measured against that which resulted
from the defendant's acts. It is not apparent why the difficulties presented
by comparing these two states, nonexistence and injured existence, to each
other should be regarded as insuperable, when comparing them to other
conditions is not.
Id.
113 E.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537; Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8.
114 E.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807.
115 E.g., Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 364 N.E.2d 1340.
116 E.g., Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496.
117 W. PROSSER, supra note 53, § 1, at 3.
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others.118 Although courts may be reluctant to do so, it is clearly
within their power to create an action for "wrongful life."" 9
When the first wrongful life suits arose, the illegality of abor-
tion provided a strong public policy argument against recogniz-
ing the cause of action. 120 The Curlender court was correct in em-
phasizing the significance of the Roe 2' decision in defining the
parameters of "wrongful life" litigation.15 As a result of that de-
cision by the United States Supreme Court, anti-abortion
grounds are no longer a basis for denying the cause of action. Re-
cent cases have acknowledged that family planning,'2 the right
to privacy in matters of procreation, 25 and the right not to have a
child 15 have achieved the status of recognized public policy. Yet
the preservation of life is also accepted public policy and the con-
flict is therefore readily apparent. 2 6 Although the judicial argu-
ments have been couched in varying terms, they essentially focus
on the sanctity of human life. ' The language of a recent deci-
sion, denying the cause of action, typifies this sentiment:
Notwithstanding her affliction with Down's Syndrome,
Sharon, by virtue of her birth, will be able to love and be loved
and to experience happiness and pleasure-emotions which are
truly the essence of life and which are far more valuable than
the suffering she may endure. To rule otherwise would require
us to disavow the basic assumption upon which our society is
based. This we cannot do.12
118 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 493 n.82.
119 Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization, supra note 17, at 644.
120 See generally Brantley, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8
ST. MARrs L.J. 140,158 (1976).
121 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113.
12 Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal..Rptr. at 483.
123 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479.
12 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
125 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
12 Brantley, supra note 120, at 158.
127 See, e.g., Comment, A Modern Claim, supra note 17, at 131. That commentator
noted: "Pervading the opinions denying recovery for wrongful life is an overriding judicial
concern for the right to life .... After Roe, acknowledging that women have the right to
choose to have abortions, courts resorted to vague declarations of the sanctity of life and
the 'obvious' preference of existence, no matter how wretched, over the 'utter void of non-
existence.' Id.
12 Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d at 13.
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Thus, it is apparent that analysis of this issue is still pervaded by
the sentiment first expressed in Gleitman that "[o]ne of the most
deeply held beliefs of our society is that life whether experienced
with or without major physical handicaps is more precious than
non-life."'
It has been observed that this rationale seems inconsistent
with the analysis and resolution of other medical-legal di-
lemmas.' 30 Other cases involving existence-nonexistence policy
considerations have not adopted the presumption found in
"wrongful life" decisions that life is always to be preferred.13 ' In
1977, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the case of
a severely retarded, institutionalized adult who was suffering
from incurable leukemia. 32 The court stated that the adverse side
effects and discomfort of the treatment, the inability of the ward
to understand the treatment, and the fear and pain he would suf-
fer as a result, outweighed the possibility of some uncertain but
limited extension of life as a result of the treatment. 13 The court
further stated that in determining whether treatment should be
provided a "substituted judgment doctrine" would be applied,
whereby the court would decide what the incompetent person
would choose if he were competent.34 Other recent decisions
have held that familial decisionmaking may extend to parents'
decisions to cease treatment and permit the death of severely ill
children. '-
Finally, an interesting dichotomy may be observed between
the wrongful life decisions denying recovery and the ongoing di-
ethysilbestrol (DES) litigation. 3 1 In the latter cases,' 37 damages
attributable to the drug, administered to pregnant mothers and
resulting in pre-natal injuries, are measured by comparing the
condition of the plaintiff with the drug-induced carcinoma to her
'2 Id. at 12.
130 See Capron, supra note 1, at 663-64.
131 Comment, The Right Not To Be Born, supra note 17, at 4 95.
132 Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
133 Id. at 419.
134 Id. at 431.
135 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
136 Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537.
137 E.g., Katz v. Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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presumed condition had her mother not taken the drug "which,
ironically, could be nonexistence, since the drug was prescribed
to decrease the incidence of spontaneous abortions in high-risk
mothers."'," Even though the damages analysis is as inherently
speculative in these cases as it is in "wrongful life" cases, neither
the measurement nor cognition of damages have been prevented
in the former. 39
These cases are significant to the "wrongful life" analysis for
three reasons. First, they indicate that the judicial presumption
that even an impaired life is preferable to non-life is philosoph-
ical rather than logical, and is in fact inconsistent with other de-
cisions. Second, they indicate that a third party-a parent or
guardian ad litem-may choose nonexistence as preferable to
existence on behalf of a child. Third, they indicate that in other
factually analogous situations courts have readily compared life
with defects to nonexistence.
CONCLUSION
The Curlender court, although cursory in its analysis, was
correct in upholding the infant's cause of action for "wrongful
life," and the California Supreme Court's refusal in a later case
to allow the award of general damages permitted under a Cur-
lender analysis was erroneous. 140 Analysis of the claim shows that
the requisite elements necessary to impose liability in tort are
present and that a traditional tort analysis is useful to ascertain
damages. Difficult proof problems and value determinations are
inherent in the recognition of such a claim, but resolution of the
issues is well within the province and skills of a jury. Further-
more, failure to recognize such a claim would be inconsistent
with the principles of expanding tort liability as applied to anal-
ogous issues and would permit a serious harm to go unredressed.
Kathleen D. Patterson
138 Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. at 543 n.12.
"' See id. at 542.
140 See note 19 supra for a discussion of the Turpin decision.
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